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Question Presented
Under what conditions does vote dilution in single district elections violate the 
rights of expression, association, and due process provided by the Constitution, 
and what standards should the Supreme Court rely on when adjudicating 
questions of vote dilution?
Background
Vote dilution occurs when the voting power of individuals is diminished. Vote 
dilution can be achieved through discriminatory voting practices or the process 
of gerrymandering, which is performed by election officials. Election officials 
can engage in both racial and partisan gerrymandering. According to the Legal 
Information Institute, “Two typical forms of vote dilution involve ‘cracking’ a 
minority community between several election districts, and ‘submerging’ minori-
ty communities in multi-member districts.”1 In gerrymandering, “cracking” 
splits up the collective votes of a minority, while “submerging,” or “packing,” 
1 Legal Information Institute, “Voting Rights Act,” Cornell University Law School, N.d., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/voting_rights_act.
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combines the votes of a minority with a majority so that the minority votes 
carry less weight. In addition to laws which require photo identification for 
voting, among others, these gerrymandering tactics effectively squander the 
right of expression and association of voters. Furthermore, vote dilution results 
in unfair treatment that violates due process of the law. All of this culminates 
to a lack of voter equality in the United States.
To begin with, the Constitution provides for the right of expression and 
association through the First Amendment. Due process is a right of the law as 
per the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution; the right to vote 
is necessary to upholding all of these rights. Although the right to vote is not 
explicitly stated in the Constitution, “the right to vote is the most important 
right granted to a U.S. citizen.”2 Nonetheless, the right to vote is not suffi-
cient to upholding the rights of expression, association, and due process. To be 
sufficient, the right to vote must include the right to an equally weighted vote. 
In Election Law: Cases and Materials, authors Hasen and Lowenstein affirm 
that “full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, 
therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of 
members of his state legislature.”3 Currently, vote dilution is preventing this.
The importance of the right to an equally weighted vote was officially recog-
nized by the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Voting Rights Act, 
or the VRA, is defined as “an important federal civil rights law that protects 
minorities from discriminatory voting practices.”4 In 1965, the significance of 
the Voting Rights Act laid in the prohibitions on practices such as literacy tests. 
The establishment of the coverage formula and preclearance was also significant. 
However, today what is most significant about the Voting Rights Act is that it 
protects against vote dilution. This is accomplished through Section 2 of the 
Act, which “prohibits drawing election districts in ways that improperly dilute 
minorities’ voting power.”5 Section 2 effectively addresses racial gerrymandering 
as a tactic of vote dilution.
The amount of voting rights cases throughout history is substantial. In 2008, 
the Supreme Court decided the case Crawford v. Marion County Election 
2 Advancement Project, “Right to Vote,” Advancement Project, N.d., http://www.advance-
mentproject.org/campaigns/protect-your-vote.
3 Daniel H. Lowenstein and Richard L. Hasen, Election Law--Cases and Materials 
(Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic, 1995).
4 Op. Cit., fn. 1
5 Ibid.
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Board. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an 
Indiana law that required voters to show photo identification prior to voting. 
The decision was made on the grounds that voter fraud posed a bigger problem 
to the state of Indiana than the votes that would be lost on account of some 
voters not having photo identification. Thus, the Court formally acknowledged 
voter fraud as a form of vote dilution, but failed to address questions of access 
under photo identification laws.
Five years later, in the 2013 Supreme Court case Shelby County v. Holder, 
the Supreme Court overturned Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which 
effectively overturned Section 5 of the Act as well. Section 4(b) of the VRA 
established the coverage formula, a formula used to identify regions where 
racially discriminatory voting practices had led to vote dilution. This formula 
was necessary because, “when Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
it determined that racial discrimination in voting had been more prevalent in 
certain areas of the country.”6 Preclearance, found in Section 5, is an extension 
of the coverage formula whereby covered regions must approve any new voting 
measures with the federal government. However, there is no power to enforce 
preclearance without a coverage formula.
Out of deference for state sovereignty, the Court in Holder felt that the 
coverage formula targeted some states too harshly, and that states should be 
able to enact their own voting measures. Part of the Court’s reasoning was 
that, “the conditions that justified Section 5 no longer characterize voting in 
the covered jurisdictions...voter turnout and registration rates now approach 
parity.” This led the Court to declare the coverage formula, which was reau-
thorized by Congress in 2006, unconstitutional. Shelby County v. Holder is 
often perceived as a setback for minority voting rights. As the dissenting opin-
ion acknowledges, “second-generation barriers” to minority voting still exist. 
These are “efforts to reduce the impact of minority votes, in contrast to direct 
attempts to block access to the ballot.”7 Photo identification laws are just one 
example of second-generation barriers to minority voting.
In 2016, the Supreme Court case Evenwel v. Abbott was a progressive 
step towards combating vote dilution. In this case, the Court held that 
6 The United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, “Section 4 Of The 
Voting Rights Act,” The U.S. Department of Justice, Last modified August 8, 2015, https://
www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act.
7 Ibid.
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total population must be used in redistricting processes, according to the 
“one person, one vote” principle implied by the Equal Protection Clause. 
This opposed the exclusive use of voting-eligible population in redistrict-
ing. Justice Ginsburg, who delivered the majority opinion, writes, “As the 
Framers of the Constitution and the 14th Amendment comprehended, 
representatives serve all residents, not just those eligible or registered to 
vote. Nonvoters have an important stake in many policy decisions.”8 Thus, 
Abbott ensured that minority groups, who are less likely to be registered 
to vote, and nonvoting groups, such as children, are still considered in the 
drawing of legislative districts. Accordingly, each member of the population 
must be given equal weight.
Lastly, Whitford v. Gill is an ongoing case that may be brought before the 
Supreme Court. On November 21st, 2016, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Wisconsin overturned legislative districts created 
by the Wisconsin Republican majority. These districts were drawn in secret, as 
Republicans prevented the Wisconsin Democratic minority from participating 
in the redistricting process. The result was malapportioned districts, largely fa-
voring Republicans. In the majority opinion, the District Court finds that, “as a 
result of the statewide partisan gerrymandering, Democrats do not have the same 
opportunity provided to Republicans to elect representatives of their choice to 
the Assembly...the electoral influence of plaintiffs and other Democratic voters 
statewide has been unfairly and disproportionately reduced.”9 In addition to 
overturning the districts contended in Gill, the District Court also approved the 
plaintiff’s proposed standard for determining unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
dering. The standard is a three-part test: plaintiffs must prove that the defendant 
had the intent of partisan gerrymandering, that the partisan gerrymandering had a 
discriminatory effect, and that the discriminatory effect did not result from some 
alternative. This standard puts a significant burden of proof on the plaintiff, but 
nevertheless should be seen as positive. Its adoption signals that vote dilution is 
a serious problem that should be addressed by the Supreme Court.
8 Justia US Supreme Court, “Evenwel v. Abbott 578 U.S. __ (2016,” Justia, N.d., https://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/578/14-940/.
9 Justia US Law, “Whitford, William et al v. Nichol, Gerald et al, No. 3:2015cv00421 
- Document 182 (W.D. Wis. 2017),” Justia, N.d., http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/wisconsin/wiwdc/3:2015cv00421/37044/182/.
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Judicable and Manageable Standards for Racial and Partisan 
Gerrymandering
Judicable and manageable standards for racial and partisan gerrymandering were 
first addressed in the landmark Supreme Court case, Baker v. Carr. The 1962 
decision gave the Court the power to decide future redistricting cases, due to 
the fact that redistricting was both a political and legal question. In the majority 
opinion, Justice Brennan states that a political question is characterized by “a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”10 
A legal question, on the other hand, does have these standards for resolving 
it. Although Justice Brennan does not explicitly offer standards for resolving 
redistricting cases, he does imply the necessity of these standards, as redistrict-
ing will be considered a legal question going forward. Since the decision made 
in Baker v. Carr, three standards have been developed to determine whether 
unconstitutional racial or partisan gerrymandering has occurred in redistricting 
processes. The first is the symmetry standard, which compares the seats that 
each political party receives relative to their vote share in an election. The second 
standard is the efficiency gap, which compares the percentage of wasted votes for 
each political party in an election. The third standard is proportionality, which 
determines “whether minorities have the opportunity to elect representatives 
of their choice in a number of districts roughly proportional to the percentage 
of minority voters in the population as a whole.”11 Proportionality measures 
racial gerrymandering, while the symmetry standard and the efficiency gap 
measure partisan gerrymandering.
To prevent racial and partisan gerrymandering, state redistricting plans must 
traditionally follow six criteria. Districts must maintain compactness, com-
munities of interest, contiguity, equal populations, partisan fairness, and a 
lack of racial political considerations involved in the process of redistricting. 
According to Professor Justin Levitt of Loyola Law School, “Few states define 
precisely what ‘compactness’ means, but a district in which people generally 
live near each other is usually more compact than one in which they do not...a 
‘community of interest’ is just a group of people with a common interest 
10 Justia US Supreme Court, “Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962),” Justia, N.d., https://
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/369/186/case.html.
11 Justin Levitt, “All About Redistricting -- Where the lines are drawn,” Loyola Law 
School, N.d., http://redistricting.lls.edu/where.php.
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(usually, a common interest that legislation might benefit).”12 Next, “a district 
is contiguous if you can travel from any point in the district to another point 
in the district without crossing the district’s boundary.”13 Finally, populations 
of districts must be kept as equal as possible.
Unfortunately, very few state redistricting plans follow the last two crite-
ria—partisan fairness and a lack of racial political considerations involved in 
the process of redistricting. “Individual districts...[are often] drawn to favor or 
disfavor candidates of a certain party, or individual incumbents or challeng-
ers.”14 As Whitford v. Gill demonstrates, majority-minority requirements in 
redistricting have been unclear for some time. “Partisan fairness” is not a strict 
enough criteria for state redistricting plans, which gives majorities the power 
to draw district lines in their favor, while minorities often lack this power. In 
addition, “redistricting has [also] been abused to dilute racial and ethnic mi-
norities’ voice at the polls.”15 This brings up questions of access, and whether 
or not minority groups have the right to an equally weighted vote. However, 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act still offers some protection for voting rights 
in the future. Looking forward, Whitford v. Gill is poised to overcome past 
issues of vote dilution if it is appealed to the Supreme Court and the District 
Court’s decision is upheld. The three-part test for unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering approved by the District Court provides a judicable and man-
ageable standard for redistricting cases. The Supreme Court should apply this 
standard to future redistricting cases, whether they involve partisan or racial 
gerrymandering. While partisan and racial gerrymandering target different 
groups of voters, they both result in vote dilution that could be effectively 
addressed by this standard.
Wisconsin Gerrymandering and Whitford v. Gill
Prior to this legal brief, six Cal Poly students enrolled in Voting Rights and 
Representation, taught by Professor Michael Latner, Ph.D., and completed a 
project where they gerrymandered the state of Wisconsin. The names of the 
collaborators were Evan Boogay, Annie Campbell, Jake Clark, Kelly Eaton, Sam 
Goldman, and Abby Bull-Windham. Their objective was to make Wisconsin’s 
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Op. Cit., fn. 12
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eight congressional districts more Republican. The old congressional districts 
from 2010 were mostly Republican to begin with. Only two districts were 
Democratic, Districts 2 and 4.
Figure 1: Map of Republican Gerrymander of Wisconsin
Beginning with partisan demographics, the old districts had an average of 
1,112,384 Republicans in the majority. There were an average of 999,946 
Democrats. In terms of racial demographics, the old districts had a total popula-
tion of 5,665,863, with a total of 4,719,502 White individuals in the majority. 
There were a total of 350,562 Black individuals, 335,096 Hispanic individuals, 
129,248 Asian individuals, and 48,301 Native American individuals in the 
population. 83,154 individuals identified themselves as another ethnicity.
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Figure 2: Table of Old and New Racial and Partisan Demographics of Wisconsin
Focusing on Districts 4 and 5, the group engaged in partisan gerrymandering 
in favor of the Republican Party to achieve their objective. Aforementioned 
District 4 was predominantly Democratic; District 5, Republican. Their ger-
rymandering technique was based on diluting the Democratic vote in District 
4 as much as possible. They used a massive portion of District 5 to “crack” the 
Democratic vote in the city of Milwaukee, located in District 4. “Cracking” 
resulted in approximately 60,000 new Republican voters in District 4 who were 
originally in District 5. The group decided to leave District 2 as a Democratic 
district. To make District 2 Republican, the students would have had to drasti-
cally alter the contiguity of the district, which would have appeared extremely 
biased. Making the district appear fair, while not actually being fair, would have 
been nearly impossible in the amount of time they had to complete the project.
After gerrymandering the state of Wisconsin, seven new congressional dis-
tricts were majority Republican, while only a single new district was majority 
Democratic. The eight new congressional districts were contiguous and of near 
equal populations. The new districts, excluding the Democratic District 2, 
contained between 51.58% and 59.28% Republican voters. District 4, which 
originally had 70.90% Democratic voters, had only 48.42% after gerrymander-
ing. These Democratic voters were moved to District 5, which had a 46.66% 
Democratic vote compared to a previous 33.40% after gerrymandering. The 
districts were not the most compact; however, the effectiveness of the partisan 
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gerrymander justified the strange appearance of some of the new congressional 
districts. Racial demographics remained the same in the new districts as in the 
old districts. Partisan demographics reflected Republicans still in the majority.
Through the gerrymandering process, the racial composition of the districts 
was altered. All of the congressional districts became majority White, between 
63.90% and 93.90%. The Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other 
populations were spread out among districts, effectively disintegrating their 
voting power. Therefore, not only did the Republican gerrymander create par-
tisan inequality in favor of Republicans, it also created racial inequality. Thus, 
the group concluded that district boundaries were extremely significant, and 
that vote dilution could easily occur through gerrymandering.
In the recent case Whitford v. Gill, the Republican Party in Wisconsin did 
exactly what Boogay, Campbell, Clark, Eaton, Goldman, and Bull-Windham did 
in their project. They enacted what was known as Act 43, governing the creation 
of the state assembly district map. The result was a Republican gerrymander of 
Wisconsin. The recent ruling on November 21, 2016, states that, “Act 43 was 
intended to burden the representational rights of Democratic voters throughout 
the decennial period by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legis-
lative seats. Moreover, as demonstrated by the 2012 and 2014 elections, among 
other evidence, we conclude that Act 43 has had its intended effect.”16 Should 
the Supreme Court find Act 43 to be an unconstitutional partisan gerryman-
der, in accordance with the District Court decision, it would be the first time 
in history.17 It would result in the three-part test becoming the judicable and 
manageable standard for partisan gerrymandering. The standard could extend 
to racial gerrymandering as well. Until then, “partisan gerrymandering [will 
increasingly become] the political choice for legislators to maintain power.”18 
It is likely that gerrymandering schemes like Act 43 will continue to threaten 
voter equality in the future.
The Broader Landscape
“Currently, politicians are allowed to choose their own voters and draw voting 
maps that are self-serving, at the expense of American voters and our democracy 
16 Op. Cit., fn 10
17 The Campaign Legal Center, “Whitford v. Gill,” The Campaign Legal Center, N.d., 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/case/whitford-v-gill.
18 Ibid.
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as a whole.”19 For example, photo identification laws, as well as registration 
requirements, tend to discriminate against poor voters, minority voters, and 
Democrats. These measures have largely been justified by the intent to prevent 
voter fraud. However, there is little evidence that voter fraud exists. New York 
University School of Law warns, “We must be careful not to undermine free 
and fair access to the ballot in the name of preventing voter fraud.”20 They find, 
“Voter fraud claims reveal that voter fraud is very rare, voter impersonation is 
nearly non-existent, and much of the problems associated with alleged fraud in 
elections relates to unintentional mistakes by voters or election administrators.”21 
But whether voter fraud is prevalent or not, it remains a form of vote dilution, 
and the Supreme Court must be careful in evaluating its effects.
Another voting rights issue is the exclusion of prisoners from voting, also 
known as felony disenfranchisement. “Forty-eight states prohibit current in-
mates from voting, 36 keep parolees from the polls, 31 exclude probationers, 
and only two—Vermont and Maine—allow inmates to vote.”22 Just like photo 
identification laws and registration requirements, felony disenfranchisement is 
a form of vote dilution that creates voter suppression. Denying felons the right 
to vote may be justified on the basis that they have broken laws. Yet, all methods 
of vote dilution are related in that they diminish the value of the individual 
vote. In a democracy, individual votes should have equal value no matter the 
individual. This is especially true in the United States, where government was 
founded upon notions of equality. As Reynolds Holding of Time states, “We 
should be finding ways to get more voters to the polls, not looking for excuses 
to keep them away.”23
Conclusion
Vote dilution is often treated as “politics as usual.” However, it creates the 
serious problem of voter inequality, and any level of voter inequality should 
not be tolerated in democratic systems. Democratic voting implies the right 
to vote, but more importantly, the right to an equally weighted vote. This is 
19 Op. Cit., fn 18
20 New York University School of Law, “Myth of Voter Fraud,” Brennan Center for 
Justice, N.d., https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/voter-fraud.
21 Ibid.
22 Reynolds Holding, “Why Can’t Felons Vote?,” Time, Inc., November 1, 2016. http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1553510,00.html.
23 Op. Cit., fn. 23
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why adopting a system of proportional representation may be the next step 
for the United States government in protecting voting rights. Until a system of 
proportional representation is put in place, recent cases like Whitford v. Gill are 
combatting vote dilution and establishing a judicable and manageable standard 
for gerrymandering. According to the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 
voting rights are a compelling state and federal interest that deserve protection 
by the Supreme Court. All things considered, the Supreme Court should apply 
strict standards when adjudicating questions of vote dilution. It goes without 
saying that it has been difficult to establish voting equality in the United States. 
There are still changes to be made before each individual in the United States 
has the right to an equally weighted vote. Getting there will require policy 
collaboration on both sides of the aisle and landmark decisions made by the 
Supreme Court. In the meantime, it is crucial to be aware of the issue of vote 
dilution in American politics and constitutional law; but more importantly, to 
be aware of its effects on electoral outcomes.
